Ten years on from the seismic Brexit vote, Larry Elliott – one of the most respected voices on the left – has once again taken up the mantle of defending Britain's decision to leave the EU. With characteristic conviction, Elliott reiterates that Brexit was a bold and necessary move, driven by both economic necessity and social frustration. He argues that the UK's membership in the European Union had constrained its ability to introduce vital reforms, and that the decision to depart has given Britain the freedom to chart its own course.
Elliott challenges the conventional wisdom that EU membership was consistently beneficial for the UK economy. Citing historical data, he notes that major European economies were growing significantly faster than the UK when Britain first applied to join the EEC, but that this trend has since reversed. He highlights the stark contrast between the US economy, which has grown by 87% since the 2008 financial crisis, and the EU's 13.5% over the same period. While acknowledging the Office for Budget Responsibility's estimate that the UK economy will be 4% smaller in 15 years than if it had remained in the single market, Elliott expresses scepticism, pointing out that former Chancellor Jeremy Hunt has questioned whether such growth would have been achievable without the UK matching US performance.
At the heart of Elliott's argument is his contention that Brexit has provided an opportunity for Britain to break free from its financial services-dominated economic model. He suggests that while the EU was not solely responsible for the UK's economic challenges, membership restricted the necessary 'freedom of manoeuvre' required for significant structural change. As evidence of this newfound autonomy, he cites the Government's decision to impose tariffs on imports and cut duties on certain food products, as well as its efforts to protect the British steel industry. He further argues that any serious attempt to reverse '40 years of neoliberalism', as advocated by figures like Andy Burnham, would necessitate curbs on the free movement of capital, goods, and people – measures explicitly forbidden by single-market rules.
Beyond economics, Elliott portrays the Brexit vote as a profound expression of anger from parts of Britain that felt neglected and forgotten. He views it as a demand for a different economic settlement, aimed at rectifying the damage caused by deindustrialisation and globalisation. This sentiment, he argues, posed a challenge to both major political parties, particularly Labour, which he suggests had tacitly accepted prevailing economic arguments since the late 1980s and subsequently focused on cultural battles.
Elliott contends that Labour's shift towards a more pro-European stance was driven by a desire to circumvent Thatcher-era restrictions on trade unions, rather than any genuine enthusiasm for EU membership. He suggests that this approach has left the party struggling to articulate an alternative economic vision, one that would genuinely address the social and economic grievances of working-class communities.
In conclusion, Elliott's reiteration of his Brexit stance is a timely reminder that the UK's departure from the EU was about more than just economics – it was also about giving voice to those who felt excluded from the benefits of globalisation. As the country continues to navigate its post-Brexit identity, Elliott's views serve as a powerful warning against allowing economic and social anxieties to be papered over with vague promises of continued integration.