A notable shift in public sentiment is being reported within Russia, as the country grapples with the most significant economic disruption to daily life since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Widespread fuel shortages, triggered by Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil infrastructure, have begun to bite across the nation since June 2026, marking a new phase in the economic impact of the ongoing conflict.
Observers who have travelled to Russia annually since the war began note a distinct change in atmosphere. Initially, in 2022, the focus was on survival and adapting to the new reality of sanctions and war. The subsequent years saw a period of stabilisation and even growing optimism about the economy's resilience. However, by early 2026, discussions of an impending economic recession were already circulating, even before the current fuel crisis took hold.
To manage inflation and balance the budget, the Russian government has already implemented several tough measures. Value Added Tax (VAT) was increased from 20% to 22% in January 2026, alongside higher taxes for small and medium-sized enterprises. With the economy operating at full capacity and military spending remaining a priority, further squeezing the civilian sector through high interest rates and additional taxes appears to be the primary strategy. At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum in June, it was suggested that these difficult economic conditions are expected to persist for at least three more years.
While the current economic difficulties might draw comparisons to the late Soviet era, which saw widespread food shortages and ultimately the collapse of the regime in 1991, the political landscape in Russia today is markedly different. Unlike Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms that decentralised power and allowed for opposition figures like Boris Yeltsin to emerge, Vladimir Putin's leadership since 2000 has been characterised by a systematic consolidation of authoritarian power. Democratic institutions have been weakened, media control tightened, and political opponents, such as Alexei Navalny, have been neutralised.
Furthermore, the Kremlin exerts significant control over Russia's business elite, particularly since Western sanctions have compelled many to return from abroad. The war has also amplified the influence of the 'siloviki' – Russia's law enforcement and security agencies – as well as the military-industrial complex and army, all of whom have a vested interest in the stability of the current regime. Despite images of queues at petrol stations, the contemporary Russian economy, after four years of conflict and sanctions, remains largely functional, and the current fuel shortages represent the first widespread crisis directly affecting the majority of the population.